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Abstract - Android has always been about connectivity and 
providing great browsing experience. Web-based content can be 
embedded into the Android application using WebView. It is a 
User Interface component that displays webpages. It can either 
display a remote webpage or can also load static HTML data. 
This encompasses the functionality of a browser that can be 
integrated to application. WebView provides a number of APIs 
which enables the applications to interact with the web content 
inside WebView. In the current paper, Cross site request forgery 
or XSRF attack specific to android WebView is investigated. In 
XSRF attack, the trusts of a web application in its authenticated 
users is exploited by letting the attacker make arbitrary HTTP 
requests on behalf of a victim user. When the user is logged into 
the trusted site through the WebView, the site authenticates the 
WebView and not application. The application can launch 
attacks on the behalf of user with the APIs of Webview, 
exploiting user’s credentials resulting in Cross site request 
forgery. Attacks can also be launched by setting cookies as 
HTTP headers and making malicious HTTP Request on behalf 
of victim. 
 
Keywords - Android WebView, Cross Site Request Forgery, 
Computer Security.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Android platform’s openness and permissive 
licensing allows the software to be freely modified and 
distributed by device manufacturers, wireless carriers and 
developers. As a result of this, Android has a large 
community of developers writing applications. The 
number of applications in the app store has been 
estimated to be 1 million with about 50 billion downloads 
till date [18]. A report in July 2013 stated that Android’s 
share of the global smart phone market was 64% in 
March 2013 [19]. The popularity of Android platform has 
led to a large number of third party applications in the 
app store which can be a potential cause of security 
threats. Many of the Android applications display web 
content and also interact with it. This is possible by 
exposing a web browser as a standalone component and 
embedding it in the application. Such a component is 
called as WebView. Android comes with a build-in high-
performance WebKit browser and applications can access  
 
 
views, that render using WebKit through WebView 
component. 
 
1.1 Introduction to Web-based APIs of WebView 
 
There are two types of APIs in WebView, the UI based 
APIs and Web-based APIs. WebView is subclass of a 
more generic View class. View occupies a rectangular 
area on the screen and is responsible for drawing and 
event handling. View is the base class for widgets, which 
are used to create interactive user interface components 
such as buttons, text fields, etc. The APIs which the 
WebView inherits from its superclass are UI based APIs. 
Attacks described in [1] target the UI based APIs. Web-
based APIs are implemented by the classes associated 
with WebView. These APIs are designed for applications 
to interact with the web contents [1]. Examples of Web-
based APIs include loadUrl, loadData etc. The attacks 
described in [2] target Web-based APIs. These include 
Event sniffing, hijacking, JavaScript injection and attacks 
through frame confusion. 
 
Cross-site scripting attacks using Web-based APIs are 
described in [3] and [12]. Web-based APIs of WebView 
are discussed in detail in section 2. 
 
1.2 Overview of Work and Contribution 
 
The present paper describes Cross Site Request forgery on 
Android WebView. When the user is logged into the 
trusted site using his login information, the target site 
authenticates the WebView and not the application. The 
application can exploit user’s authenticated session and 
launch attacks, resulting in Cross site request forgery. The 
attacks can be modeled using three of the Web-based APIs, 
WebView.loadUrl, WebView.loadData and 
WebView.postUrl. Such attacks result in automatic form 
submissions with user’s credentials. Attacks can also be 
modeled by sending malicious HTTP requests to the 
server exploiting user’s credentials. The cookies from 
WebView can be gathered from the 
CookieManager.getCookie() method, and can be set as 
HTTP headers. The HTTP request will now contain user’s 
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login information such as session ID that is gathered from 
cookies. Attacker can send malicious HTTP GET or 
POST to the trusted site, with user’s login information. 
HTTPClient APIs are described in detail in Section 3. 
 
2. WebView APIs 
 
WebKit is a layout engine for a large number of browsers 
including Google’s chrome web browser and default 
browser in Android. The android.webkit package provides 
tools for browsing the web. WebView is one of the most 
important classes of the package. It enables the developer 
to embed a built-in Web browser as widget, for displaying 
HTML content and browsing the web. In addition, 
WebKit is a layout engine designed to allow web browsers 
to render web pages. It serves as a backend rendering to 
WebView. The android.webkit provides several other 
classes such as CookieManager, CookieSyncManager, 
WebSettings, WebStorage etc. Jointly, these classes 
expose many APIs to Android applications. Based on 
their purposes, these APIs can be divided into two main 
categories, the Web-based APIs and UI based APIs [2]. 
The current paper describes attacks related to Web-based 
APIs of WebView and also related to the CookieManager 
class. 
 
2.1 CookieManager 
 
A cookie, also known as an HTTP cookie, is a small piece 
of data sent from a website and stored in a user’s web 
browser while a user is browsing a website. The data 
stored in the cookie is then sent back to the server each 
time the browser requests a page from the server. The 
CookieManager class in Android manages cookies used 
by an application’s WebView. This class provides a 
number of public methods such as getCookie, 
acceptCookie() etc. 
 
3. HttpClient APIs 
 
The Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is perhaps the 
most significant protocol used on the Internet today. 
HttpClient provides an efficient, up-to-date, and feature-
rich package implementing the client side of the most 
recent HTTP standards and recommendations. HttpClient 
Class is an interface for HTTP client. HTTP clients 
encapsulate objects required to execute HTTP requests 
while handling cookies, authentication, connection 
management, and other features. The most essential 
function of HttpClient is to execute HTTP methods [23]. 
Execution of an HTTP method involves one or several 
HTTP request or HTTP response exchanges, usually 
handled internally by HttpClient. The user is expected to 
provide a request object to execute and HttpClient is 
expected to transmit the request to the target server to 
return a corresponding response object, or throw an 
exception if execution was unsuccessful. Here is an 
example of request execution process: 
 
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient(); 
 
As shown in the code above, DefaultHttpClient is the 
default implementation of the HttpClient interface[20]. 
 
3.1 HttpRequest 
 
HttpClient supports HTTP methods defined in the 
HTTP/1.1 specification [10], GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, 
DELETE, TRACE and OPTIONS. There is a specific 
class for each method type: HttpGet, HttpHead, HttpPost, 
HttpPut, HttpDelete, HttpTrace, and HttpOptions. The 
Request-URI are a Uniform Resource Identifier that 
identifies the resource upon which to apply the request. 
HTTP request URIs consists of a protocol scheme, 
hostname, optional port, resource path, optional query, 
and optional fragment. The code fragment is given below 
[24]: 
 
HttpPost httpPost = new HttpPost( 
                       "http://www.targetSite.com/cgi-bin 
                                    /Forum/new_pm.php"); 
 
3.2 HttpResponse 
 
HTTP response represents the message returned to a 
client in response to an HTTP request. The first line 
of that message consists of the protocol version 
followed by a numeric status code and its associated 
textual phrase. The execute method executes the 
request using the default context and returns the 
response to the request [24]. 
HttpResponse response = 
httpClient.execute(httpPost); 
 
3.3 HTTP Message Headers 
 
A HTTP message can contain a number of headers 
describing properties of the message such as the content 
length, content type and so on. The method setHeader 
overwrites the first header with the same name. The new 
header will be appended to the end of the list, if no header 
with the given name can be found. The method takes two 
arguments, first one being the name of the header and 
second one being the value of the header [25]. 
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httpPost.setHeader("Cookie", cookie); 
 
4. Attack Model 
 
For all the attacks described in the paper, we have the 
following assumptions: 
 
1) User must be authenticated to the trusted site: 
Cross site, Request forgery attacks exploit the 
user’s credentials after the user is logged into the 
trusted site throughWebView. Therefore an 
assumption is being made that the user must be 
logged into trusted site, for the attacks to be 
successful. 
2) Application must be granted permission to access 
the Internet: For the attacks described throughout 
the paper, the application needs to be granted 
with permission Android.permission.INTERNET. 
This permission is granted to 65 percent of the 
paid applications and 86.6% of free applications 
[4].The attacks are quite easy to launch as these 
permissions are granted to most of the 
applications. 
3) Attacks are related to third party applications: 
The paper describes the vulnerabilities in the 
third party Android applications. The developer 
of the third party application and owner of web 
content inside WebView are not the same. 
Therefore, there is a potential threat from a 
malicious application installed on the android 
device. 
 
5. Cross Site Request Forgery 
 
The Cross site request forgery is an attack which forces 
end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application 
using his authority or credentials. It is one of the top 10 
security vulnerabilities of 2013 [6]. In a CSRF attack, a 
malicious site instructs a victim’s browser to send a 
request to honest site, as if the request were part of the 
victim’s interaction with the honest site, leveraging the 
victim’s network connectivity and the browsers state, such 
as cookies, to disrupt the integrity of the victim’s session 
with the honest site [7]. Depending on the application, the 
attacker could, for instance, post messages in the name of 
victim, or even change victim’s login name and password. 
XSRF attack is much different from the XSS or Cross site 
Scripting attacks described in [3]. In XSS attacks, the 
attacker executes a malicious script on the victim’s 
browser and steals sensitive information such as cookies. 
In XSRF attacks, the attacker sends malicious requests on 
victim’s behalf by exploiting the authenticated session of 
victim. Unlike cross-site scripting (XSS), which exploits 
the trust a user, has for a particular site, XSRF exploits 
the trust that a site has in a user’s browser or WebView. 
XSS is about injecting malicious scripts in web pages. 
The malicious scripts in turn gains access to sensitive 
information and begin to misuse it. In XSRF, the attacker 
exploits the credentials of the user who is authenticated to 
the trusted site and sends HTTP requests to that site on 
behalf of the user. 
 
In the current paper, Cross site request forgery specific to 
android WebView is investigated. When the user is 
logged into trusted site, the site authenticates WebView 
and not the application. The application can exploit the 
user’s session and launch attacks on the behalf of user 
with the APIs of WebView. The attacks are modeled 
using three of the WebViews APIs, loadUrl, postUrl and 
loadData. The attacks can also be modeled by the HTTP 
GET or HTTP POST requests. When the user is 
authenticated with trusted site, cookies can be gathered 
through the CookieManager. The cookies which are 
gathered can be appended to the list of headers of the 
HTTP Request using the method setHeader. These attacks 
are described in detail in the following subsections. 
 
5.1 Attacks using HttpRequests through 
WebView.loadUrl 
 
One of the methods to perform POST/GET requests to 
another host is to use the HTML form tag with the action 
attribute set to the target URL. The malicious HTML file 
is provided as a part of the application in the assets folder 
in Android device. The HTML form is shown in Fig 1. 
The required form fields are set the desired values, in the 
HTML file. The attacker can now execute the HTML file, 
and submit the form programmatically by using 
webView.loadUrl. 
 
webView.loadUrl("http://trustedSite.com/ 
cgi-bin/Forum/index.php"); 
 
Fig. 1 Malicious HTML form 
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When the user is logged into the target site using his 
credentials, the site authenticates WebView, and not the 
application. The malicious application can now exploit 
the user’s credentials and submit POST requests on behalf 
of the user, resulting in the XSRF attacks, as shown in Fig. 
2. The attacks can also be modeled using GET requests. 
 
Fig. 2 Attacks using Malicious HTML form. 
 
5.2 Attack using HTTP requests through 
WebView.loadData 
 
WebView loads raw HTML data using loadData method. 
The method takes three input parameters, a string of data 
in the given encoding, MIME type of data and the 
encoding of data, which specifies whether it is base64 or 
URL encoded. The HTML data containing GET or POST 
request is assigned to a string, and passed as a parameter 
to the WebView.loadData. The malicious requests to the 
server through the API, can leverage the user’s login 
session, and submit HTML form automatically on behalf 
of user. 
 
webView.loadData(attackData, "text/html; 
charset=utf-8", "UTF-8"); 
 
5.3 Attacks by sending HTTP POST requests through 
WebView.postUrl 
 
The method postUrl loads the URL with postData 
using”POST” method into the WebView. The method 
takes two parameters, the URL of the resource to load and 
the data to be passed to ”POST” request. 
 
String postData = "recip=user1 
&title=WebViewAttackTitle 
&message=HttpAttackMessage"; 
 
String attackUrl = 
"http://www.trustedSite.com/ 
cgi-bin/Forum/new_pm.php"; 
 
webView.postUrl(attackUrl,      EncodingUtils.getBytes 
(postData, "base64")); 
 
The EncodingUtils class has a collection of utility 
methods for various encoding tasks. The getBytes method 
converts string to a base64 byte array. The byte array is 
sent as HTTP POST request to the target site, where the 
user is logged in. The method leverages the users 
credentials and sends the HTTP POST request on the 
behalf of user. The attacks are shown in Fig 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Attacks using Web-based APIs. 
 
5.4 Attacks using HttpClient APIs 
 
HTTP cookies provide the server with a mechanism to 
store and retrieve state information on the client 
application’s system. This mechanism allows web-based 
applications, the ability to store information about session 
IDs, selected items, user preferences, registration 
information, and other information that can be retrieved 
later. Android applications can monitor the events 
occurred within WebView, by overriding the 
shouldOverrideUrlLoading hook, which is triggered by 
the navigation event. Cookies can be gathered at every 
page Navigation of the user using the method getCookie() 
from 
CookieManager class as shown in the code fragment 
below: 
 
CookieManager cookieManager = 
CookieManager.getInstance();  
 
final String cookie = 
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cookieManager.getCookie(url); 
 
The cookies which are gathered can be appended to the 
list of headers of the HTTP Request using the method 
setHeader. The attack can be executed by sending the 
HTTP GET/POST request as shown below: 
 
HttpClient httpClient = 
new DefaultHttpClient(); 
 
HttpPost httpPost = 
new HttpPost("http://www.targetSite.com/cgi-
bin/Forum/new_pm.php"); 
 
httpPost.setHeader("Cookie", cookie); 
 
HttpResponse response = 
httpClient.execute(httpPost); 
 
The attacker is now able to exploit the user’s login session 
by appending the cookies to the HTTP Request methods, 
and will be able to send the requests on users behalf 
resulting in Cross site request forgery. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Attacks using HTTP Client APIs. 
 
6. Implementation 
 
To demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks, a simple 
PHP forum script called Forum installed at the server side 
[21]. The script uses a backend MySQL database. It has 
an internal registering system, where users can register 
their login ID and password; they can post topics and 
reply to others. At the device side, for the experiments, I 
used the Celkon’s CT2 tab with Android version 4.3.3 
(codename Icecream sandwich). A malicious application 
was developed, for each of the use cases described in 
section 5. Throughout the paper it was assumed that the 
user is logged into the malicious application using his 
username and password. For the attacks related to the 
Web-based APIs that were described in section 5 
automatic form submissions were tested using both GET 
and POST requests using WebView.loadUrl and 
WebView.loadData. The form submissions resulted in 
posting topics by the attacker on behalf of the user. The 
automatic form submissions using POST requests were 
also tested using WebView.postUrl API. Attacks were 
also modeled using the HTTPClient APIs. A malicious 
application was developed to gather cookies from 
WebView, by using the CookieManager.getCookie() 
method. The cookies were set as HTTP headers. The 
HTTP requests contained session ID that was gathered 
from cookies. The attacks were tested by sending both 
GET and POST requests to the Forum site. This resulted 
in posting topics by the attacker on the Forum site, on 
behalf of user. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the present work, Cross site request forgery attacks on 
Android Webview is studied. When the user is logged into 
the trusted site through WebView, the site authenticates 
the WebView and not the application. The Android 
application can exploit the user’s credentials through the 
Web-based APIs of WebView. The web-based APIs can 
submit forms automatically and post malicious content on 
the trusted site on the behalf of attacker. Three such 
attacks are modeled using APIs WebView.loadUrl, 
WebView.loadData and WebView.postUrl. The attacks 
can also be launched by appending cookies to the HTTP 
headers and HTTP Requests can be sent to the trusted site 
using user’s credentials. The attacks are easy to execute, 
but difficult to detect and prevent, as the user is not aware 
that the attacks are being executed using his credentials. 
Future work will focus on developing solutions to defend 
against such attacks on WebView. 
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